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IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

KENNETH M. ZERAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICA ONLINE, INC.,
Defendant.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 96-1564-A

--------------------------)
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON TIlE PLEADINGS

Plaintiff Kenneth Zei"an filed this action against defendant America Online, Inc.
("AOL") seeking to recover damages allegedly resulting from messages posted on AOL' s
interactive computer service by an unknown third party. As this Memorandum demonstrates,
Zeran's Complaint fails as a matter of law to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
AOL is therefore entitled to jud~ent on the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).

Section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), 47 U.S.c.
§ 230, prohibits tort actions that seek to treat an interactive computer service provider such as
AOL as "the publisher or speaker" of content provided by othersY Because holding AOL

Although two lower courts have enjoined enforcement of portions of the CDA
pending appeal to the Supreme Court, Section 230 of the CDA is unaffected by those
proceedings. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.) (enjoining enforcement of Sections
223(a) and (d) of the CDA), prob. juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996); Shea v. Reno, 930
F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (enjoining enforcement of Section 223(d) of the CDA).
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liable for posted messages that are in no way attributable to AOL would treat AOL as "the.
publisher or speaker" of those messages, the CDA bars Plaintiff s claims.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

AOL operates an interactive computer service over which millions of subscribers,
who pay a fee to AOL, disseminate and receive information by means of computer modem
connections to AOL's computer network. Much of the information transmitted over AOL's
service originates with AOL subscribers. AOL subscribers may transmit information over
. AOL's service through a variety of methods, including electronic mail messages (which are
private electronic communications addressed to specific recipients) and bulletin board postings
(which are messages generally available for review by other subscribers).

According to the Complaint,Y on April 25, 1995, a "currently unidentified
person" using the screen name "Ken ZZ03"~ posted on AOL's interactive computer service a
message advertising "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts" with "grossly offensive" slogans referring
to the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City. (Complaint

~

5.) The posting

indicated that anyone interested in the t-shirts should contact "Ken" and provided a phone

For purposes of a Rule 12(c) motion, the allegations in the complaint are
accepted as true and "construed favorably to the plaintiff." Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272,
273 (4th Cir. 1980). By reciting Plaintiffs allegations, AOL does not concede the truth of
those allegations beyond any facts already admitted in its Answer.

Y

~

A "screen name" is a unique set of characters (letters or numbers) that identifies a
person or entity that originates a message or posting transmitted via an interactive computer
service or the internet. AOL permits each of the subscribers to its service to have as many as
five different screen names of no more than ten characters each. It is commonplace for an AOL
subscriber's screen name(s) to be different from his or her real name.
-2-
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number that allegedly belonged to Plaintiffs business. (Id.

~

5, Ex. A.) After Zeran learned

of the message from a reporter's phone call, Zeran allegedly informed AOL that the posting
was a hoax and asked that it be removed. (Id.

~~

6-7.) Zeran allegedly began receiving

"derogatory" and threatening phone calls as a result of the posted message. (Id.

~

8.)

After being contacted by Zeran, AOL deleted the posted message. (rd.

~

10.)

Over the next three days (from April 26 until April 28, 1995), an unidentified person (or
persons) using two slightly different screen names posted three similar messages. (Id.

~~

10,

15, 26.) During this period, Zeran allegedly communicated with AOL on a number of
occasions in an effort to have the messages removed. (rd.

~~

12-14.) Zeran claims he

received additional calls about the messages from individuals who saw or heard about the
po stings, including three from reporters. (Id.

~~

9, 11-13, 18.) The reporters are not alleged

to have done any stories on the incident, apparently because Zeran informed them that he was
not connected with the messages. (Id.

~~

9, 11, 18.)

On May 1, 1995, a person using the name "Eck (Hollywood) Prater"
purportedly sent a copy of one of the posted messages by electronic mail to Mark Shannon, a
radio broadcaster on KRXO in Oklahoma City. (Id.

~

19, Ex. D.) That day, KRXO allegedly

aired a broadcast in which Shannon read out parts of the message, "incited the audience to
call plaintiff and gave plaintiffs business phone number over the air." (rd.

~

20.) As a result

of the broadcast, Plaintiff allegedly "was bombarded with death threats and other forms of
recrimination as well as violent language from Oklahoma City." (Id.

-3-

~

21; see also id.

~

24.)

;

.

(

.(

Plaintiff does not allege that any of the messages at issue remained on AOL' s
interactive computer service after May 1, 1995, or that any new offensive messages were
posted after that date. (Id.

~

26.) Plaintiff does not allege that any particular message

remained available on AOL's service for longer than three days.1I Although Plaintiff claims
that he continued to receive calls about the incident until May 14, 1995, he admits that some
of those calls were apologies and even offers of assistance in the event of litigation. (Id.
~~

29, 34, 36-39.)

On January 4, 1996, Zeran filed suit in federal district court in Oklahoma
against the owner of radio station KRXO).' In that suit, he alleges that the station's broadcast
in which Shannon read aloud portions of one of the posted messages constituted defamation,
false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The suit
against KRXO remains pending in Oklahoma.

On April 23, 1996, several months after suing KRXO, Plaintiff filed this
separate action against AOL in the same Oklahoma district court. His complaint alleges that,
upon notice that the first posting about Oklahoma City t-shirts was a hoax, AOL had a duty to

According to the Complaint, the first offensive t-shirt message was posted on
April 25, 1995, and deleted a day later. (Complaint ~~ 5, 10.) The second and third such
messages appear to have been posted on April 26, 1995, and April 28, 1995, respectively. ad.
~~ 10, 15 & Exs. B, C.) The Complaint makes no allegation about how long these messages
remained available on AOL. The Complaint alleges that the fourth (and apparently final) such
message was posted at approximately 5:00 p.m. on April 28, 1995 (a Friday) and was still
available on AOL's service on the afternoon of May 1, 1995 (a Monday, three days later). 'a d.
~26 & Ex. E.)

11

Zeran v. Diamond Broadcasting, Inc., No. CIV-96-0008-T (W.D. Ok.).
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take reasonable care not only to remove the posting, but also to notify all AOL subscribers
that the posting was fraudulent, and to employ some screening mechanism to prevent further
postings containing his name or telephone number. (Id.

~~

42-43.) The Complaint posits

these duties on the basis of a single district court decision applying the law of New York (id.
~

43), a state whose law does not govern this suit.

On October 16, 1996, the district court in Oklahoma entered an order granting
AOL's motion to transfer the case to this Court.§!

ARGUMENT
I.

SECTION 230 OF THE CDA IMMUNIZES INTERACTIVE SERVICE
PROVIDERS SUCH AS AOL FROM TORT LIABILITY FOR CONTENT
PROVIDED BY THIRD PARTIES.

Interactive computer services -- which enable people to communicate with one
another with unprecedented speed and ease through the internet and related types of electronic
networks and services -- are rapidly revolutionizing the way in which people and businesses
share and receive information and interact with one another. One ofthe great challenges
presented by this revolution is to develop legal rules to govern this new and dynamic medium of
communication, including rules specifying who may be held liable for defamatory or harassing
content disseminated over an interactive computer network. A year ago, Congress responded to
this challenge with enactment of the CDA.

While this action was pending in the Oklahoma federal court, AOL also filed a
motion to dismiss Zeran's complaint. That motion has never been ruled on, and AOL hereby
withdraws it in favor of this one.

§!
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One ofthe CDA's key provisions, Section 230, addressed and eliminated
uncertainties in the law governing whether providers of interactive computer services, such as
AOL, can be held liable for tortious coritent that other persons or entities create and cause to be
disseminated by means of such services. Congress determined in Section 230 that providers of
such services are immune from liability for harms caused by the dissemination of such
information. Congress took this action because it recognized that saddling interactive computer
services with liability in these circumstances would be inconsistent with the vigorous and vibrant
development of this new and important means of communication.

Plaintiff's action seeks to impose on AOL liability for allegedly tortious messages
created and posted on AOL's interactive computer service by a third party. The action is
therefore barred by Section 230 of the CDA and should be dismissed as a matter of law.

A.

The PlaiD Terms of Section 230 Bar Plaintiff's Suit.

Section 230 of the CDA states that
[n]o provider ... of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). It further provides that
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section.
Id. § 230(d)(3).

- 6-
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These provisions operate in the present case to bar Plaintiff s action. First, as a
threshold matter, AOL clearly is a "provider ... of an interactive computer service" within
the meaning of Section 230(c)(1). The statute defmes an "interactive computer service" to
include "any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by- multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or
system that provides access to the Internet." Id. § 230(e)(2). AOL's electronic information
service, which presently and at the time of the events alleged in the complaint enabled
millions of AOL subscribers to access AOL' s computerized information service and the
internet through modem connections to computer servers, plainly falls within this definition.

Second, the messages about which Plaintiff complains are "information
provided by another information content provider" within the meaning of Section 230(c)(1).
The statute defines "information content provider" as "any person or entity that is responsible,
in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer· service." Id. § 230(e)(3). As the complaint
alleges, the messages at issue here were created and placed upon AOL' s interactive computer
service not by AOL, but by an "unidentified person" using the screen names "Ken ZZ03",
"Ken ZZ033", and "Ken Z033". (Complaint

~~

5, 10, 15.) Accordingly, as happens with the

hundreds of thousands of messages that AOL's subscribers post every day on AOL's service,
AOL's role in this instance was merely that of a distributor of someone else's information.
The unidentified person was the "information content provider" of the postings, and those
postings were "information provided by another information content provider" -- that is,
information from an information content provider Qther than AOL.
-7-
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Third, Zeran's suit, which attempts to impose on AOL damages that allegedly
were caused by messages posted on AOL' s system by another person, seeks to have this Court
"treat[]" AOL "as the publisher or speaker" of those messages. Although the suit is couched
as a claim that AOL was "negligent" in failing to delete andlor block the messages quickly
enough after being notified that the initial message was a hoax, imposing liability on AOL for
such an alleged failure to block dissemination would be no different from treating it as the
publisher of those messages. Indeed, the duties Plaintiff seeks to impose on AOL -- to screen
messages (i.e., edit content) and to retract those that are inaccurate -- are precisely the tasks
that a publisher undertakes. Moreover, as demonstrated by Plaintiffs related suit against the
radio station -- which affirmatively published 0I1e of the messages by having an announcer
read it over the air -- the damages sought here are exactly the same as those that could be
sought in a tort action against a publisher of defamatory content. In every respect, imposing
liability upon AOL for these messages would treat AOL as if it had actually been the
originator and publisher (or speaker) of the messages -- precisely the treatment of an
"interactive computer service" provider that the statute was designed to proscribe.

Accordingly, even if applicable state or local law would otherwise permit a
negligence action of this sort (which AOL does not concede), Section 230 expressly prohibits
it because it constitutes a cause of action "under [a] state or local law that is inconsistent with
this section." 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(3).

-8-
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B.

Construing Section 230 as Barring Plaintiff's Suit Is Consistent with the
Broader Purposes of that Section.

As both the statutory language and legislative history demonstrate, Congress
enacted Section 230 to foster robust and vibrant discourse over computer networks, at least in
part by removing tort liability from the distributor of third-party electronic content -- the
interactive service provider -- and thereby eliminating incentives those providers would
otherwise have to censor such content. At the same time, Congress recognized that
defamation and other forms of harassment are serious problems for this rapidly emerging
medium of communication. Congress made the key policy judgment that the best way to
address these problems was to strengthen enforcement of existing laws against the actual
soUrces of such unlawful content, not to impose liability on those who simply distribute the
content.

As the text of Section 230 states, Congress found that "interactive computer
services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity" and that these services had
"flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation:" Id.
§§ 230(a)(3)-(4) (emphasis added). As a result, the explicit goal of Section 230 is ''to
promote the continued development of . . . interactive computer services" and "to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation." Id. §§ 230(b)(1)-(2) (emphasis
added). Congress recognized that a regulatory regime under which interactive computer
service providers faced potential liability as publishers or speakers of content produced by
-9-
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others inevitably would lead such providers to censor the content of speech on their networks
to avoid the risk of liability, or even cause some providers to stop offering their services
altogether. Such a course would impede the diversity and vibrancy of discourse in
cyberspace. To avoid suppressing the development of interactive services in this manner,
Congress granted these service providers immunity from tort liability for content provided by
others.

At the same time, recognizing the need to deter and punish truly tortious
speech, Congress made the correlative choice to emphasize enforcement of the laws against
the actual wrongdoer -- the person who was responsible for the tortious content. Congress
expressly sought "to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer." Id. § 230(b)(5).
Thus, Congress made the policy decision to deter harassment and tortious speech via
computers not by punishing the intermediary or distributor and thereby dampening the free
flow of communication over interactive computers services, but by putting the focus on the
culpable developer and publisher of the unlawful content. As a result of this deliberate
legislative choice, Plaintiffs remedies, if any, lie not with AOL, but with the person who
wrote and posted the messages at issue and with the radio station KRXO which allegedly
broadcast one of the messages on the air.

The legislative history of Section 230 further confirms that Congress decided
that state laws should not address the problem of tortious and harassing computer speech by
making interactive computer service providers such as AOL liable for third-party content.

- 10-
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Legislators understood that interactive service providers could not as a practical matter edit
third-party content in the same manner as do publishers of books or newspapers:
There is no way that any of those entities, like Prodigy, can take
the responsibility to edit out information that is going to be
coming in to them from all manner of sources onto their bulletin
board. We are talking about something that is far larger than our
daily newspaper. We are talking about something that is going
to be thousands of pages of information every day, and to have
that imposition imposed on them is wrong. [Section 230] will
cure that problem . . . .
141 Congo Rec. H8471 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (Aug. 4, 1995). In order to relieve
interactive service providers from any duty they might have to edit third-party content,
Congress enacted Section 230 and exempted them from tort liability for such content.

Congress's intention to immunize interactive service providers such as AOL
from liability for third-party content is further demonstrated by the legislation's conference
report, which states that one of the purposes of Section 230 was to overturn the only case in
which such a service provider had ever been found liable for content provided by others. In
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1, *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995), a district court had concluded that the interactive service provider Prodigy
could be liable for an allegedly libelous message posted by an unidentified bulletin board
user. The court had decided to treat Prodigy as a publisher of the message because Prodigy
had held itself out to the public as a family-oriented service and exercised editorial control by,
for example, screening all messages before they were posted on its bulletin boards and
blocking those it deemed offensive. See id. at **3-4.

- 11 -
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Section 230 overruled this decision. As the Conference Report stated:
One of the specific purposes of [Section 230] is to overrule
Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions
which have treated such providers and users as publishers or
speakers of content that is not their own because they have
restricted access to objectionable material.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at '194 (1996). Indeed, Congress was so intent on protecting
interactive service providers from liability for third party content that it enacted a provision
specifically designed to address the Prodigy situation. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) ("No
provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of any action
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider
... considers to be ... harassing, or otherwise objectionable.").

C.

Plaintiff Cannot Circumvent the Bar of Section 230 By Characterizing His
Suit as a Claim of Simple Negligence.

If Zeran had cast his claim against AOL as a defamation claim, as he did in his
parallel lawsuit against radio station KRXO, it obviously would fall within the proscription of
Section 230. The basic elements of any claim for defamation include that the defendant be the
"publisher" of the statement that is the subject ofthe lawsuit and that he have "publishe[d]" it
with a level of fault amounting to (at least) negligence. See Restatement (Second) of Torts,
§ 558 (1977). Therefore, a fortiori, had Zeran sued AOL for defamation, his claim would have
been barred by Section 230's prohibition of suits seeking to treat an interactive computer service
"as the publisher ... of any information provided by another information content provider."

- 12-
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Perhaps recognizing the futility of a straightforward defamation action in the face
of section 230, Zeran has pleaded his claim against AOL as sounding in simple "negligence," not
defamation. Zeran asserts that AOL should be liable on the theory that it was "negligent" in
permitting a third-party's allegedly false messages to be disseminated over its service once it
knew they were a hoax. However, Section 230's prohibition of lawsuits that seek to treat
interactive computer services as publishers of third-party content would be rendered meaningless,
if it could be avoided simply by the sleight of hand of recasting a claim for negligently
"publishing" a third-party's false message (i.e., a defamation claim) as a claim for negligently
failing to prevent that same message from being blocked or deleted with sufficient speed. As a
practical matter, the claims are indistinguishable. If Section 230 were construed in a manner that
would permit Zeran's "negligence" claim to survive, then virtually every claim that is barred by
Section 230 could be restated in the same fashion. Congress obviously did not intend for the
prqtections it created in Section 230 to be so easily eviscerated.

In analogous contexts, courts have routinely rejected attempts by creative litigants

to evade the many protections that the law affords to defamation defendants by repackaging
defamation claims in the guise of other torts. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 5657 (1988) (plaintiff cannot circumvent First Amendment defenses to defamation action by
pleading a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Moldea v. New York Times
Co., 22 F.3d 310,319 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 202 (1994) (plaintiff may not "avoid
the strictures of the burdens of proof associated with defamation by resorting" to an alternative
tort (quoting Moldea v. New York Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). "Without
such a rule, virtually any defective defamation claim ... could be revived by pleading it as one
- 13-
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for [another tort]." Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine. Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1408, 1420 (C.D. Cal.
1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 1188, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812 (1989) (rejecting claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress). For the same reasons that courts have traditionally blocked
plaintiffs from evading common law and First Amendment constraints on defamation claims
through tricks~of pleading, Section 230 must be construed to bar Zeran's "negligence" claim.

The conclusion that Section 230 encompasses -- and thus bars -- Plaintiff's
"negligence" claim is underscored by the very case that he posits as the source of the "duty to
screen" that he alleges AOL negligently failed to meet, namely Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Zeran alleges that this case, decided more than four years
before enactment of Section 23 Qby a district court applying the common law of New York,
created a duty for interactive computer services, "after due notice," to "screen incendiary,
defamatory andlor bogus material" posted by third persons. (See Complaint ~ 43.) The Court in
Cubby held that Compuserve, another interactive computer service, could not be liable in tort for
defamatory content posted on its system by a third party absent evidence that it knew or had
reason to know of the defamatory statements. 776 F. Supp. at 140-41. Zeran leaps from this
holding to the novel proposition -- unrecognized by any court in any jurisdiction -- that an
interactive computer service that receives a complaint about an allegedly defamatory message
posted on its system has a duty not merely to remove that message, but also to intervene to
prevent any and all persons who use its service from posting any subsequent messages that
repeat the alleged defamation. (Complaint ~~ 42-44.)

- 14-
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Even assuming for the sake of argument that Cubby would have supplied a basis
for holding AOL liable in the absence of Section 230,11 a tort action based upon a duty allegedly
deriving from Cubby plainly is barred by Section 230's prohibition of lawsuits that treat an
interactive computer provider as the "publisher" of third-party content. The entire analysis of the court in Cubby revolved around whether Compuserve could lawfully be treated as the
publisher of defamatory content posted by third parties, such that it could be held liable on
claims of libel, business disparagement, or unfair competition. Thus, the Cubby court stated that
the central issue with respect to the libel claim was whether or not there was a sufficient factual
basis to subject Compuserve, as a distributor of third-party information, to the general rule that
"one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had
originally published it." 776 F. Supp. at 139 (citations omitted, emphasis added).

§!

Drawing on

precedents protecting distributors of information such as news vendors, book stores and libraries

11
Ev~n in the absence of Section 230, and even if this suit were governed by New
York common law (which it is not), the Cubby decision still would not support holding AOL
liable. Cubby at most suggests (in dicta) that an interactive computer service may be liable for a
defamatory message posted by a third person if the service knows, or has reason to know, about
the particular message and the fact that it is defamatory. Nothing in Cubby supports Plaintiff's
central proposition that an interactive computer service was obligated -- even under the preSection 230 law of New York -- to create and deploy screening technology that would
automatically detect and block new messages that the service does not know about but that are
similar to an earlier message that had generated a complaint. Likewise, nothing in Cubby
provides any basis for arguing that an interactive computer service that deletes allegedly
defamatory postings within a matter of hours or a few days -- as AOL did here -- can be held
liable for damages allegedly caused during the short time that the postings were available on
line.

Similarly, the determinative issue concerning Cubby's business disparagement
claim was whether Compuserve could be treated as having made "a knowing publication of false
matter derogatory to plaintiff's business." Id. at 141 (citation omitted, emphasis added).
Likewise, for the unfair competition claim, the issue was whether Compuserve had "intentionally
uttered" an injurious falsehood. Id. at 142 (citations omitted, emphasis added).

§!
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from tort liability for defamatory statements, and relying in part on First Amendment concerns,
Cubby held that Compuserve could not be treated as the publisher of defamatory statements
posted by third parties -- and therefore could not be held liable under any of the asserted tort
theories -- if it neither knew nor had reason to know of the defamation. Id. at 140-42.

Thus, far from supporting Plaintiff's claim against AOL, Cubby is representative
of a more general common law rule that a mere distributor of information supplied by third
parties may not be held liable for injury caused by dissemination of that information in the
absence of facts establishing that it was a publisher of the information.

See,~,

Anderson v.

New York Telephone Co., 320 N.E.2d 647,647 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1974) (adopting lower court
dissenting opinion published at 345 N,Y.S.2d 740, 751 (1973» (telephone company could not
be liable for tape-recorded defamatory messages repeatedly transmitted over its network "unless
it is held that ... it 'published'" the messages); Tacket v. General Motors Corp., 836 F.2d 1042
(7th Cir. 1987) (owner of property on which someone had posted defamatory sign not liable
absent a showing that the owner "'intentionally and unreasonably fail[ed] to remove' [the] sign
and thereby published its contents") (emphasis added); Hellar v. Bianco, 244 P.2d 757 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (where defamatory writings appeared on a men's room wall, jury must
decide if bartender's failure to remove the graffiti for a short time after learning of its existence
constituted a publication).21

21
Accord Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 577(2) (1977) ("One who intentionally
and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory material that he knows to be exhibited on [his
property] is subject to liability for its continued publication."); id. § 581, ill. 4 (telegraph
company without reason to know message is defamatory "is not liable for publishing a libel"
(emphasis added»; Prosser and Keeton on the Law of TOlts, § 113, at 803 (5th ed. 1984)
(describing libraries, news vendors, and other disseminators as "secondary publishers").
- 16-
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In this case, however, the express terms of Section 230 obviate any need for a
Cubby-type inquiry into whether there is a factual basis to treat AOL as a "publisher" of the
messages at issue. Even assuming (for the sake of argument) that application of Cubby in this
case would support the conclusion that AOL should be liable for Plaintiff's alleged injury, such
liability necessarily would be based on the premise that AOL was the "publisher" of the
messages at issue. Section 230 expressly bars claims that seek to treat an interactive computer
service as the "publisher or speaker" of third-party information and therefore immunizes AOL
from such liability.

In sum, no matter how Plaintiff chooses to label his suit, holding AOL liable in
this case would place it in the same legal position as the actual speaker or publisher of these
messages. Because section 230 prohibits such a result, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.

n.

SECTION 230 OF THE CDA REQUIRES DIS:MISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S SUIT
EVEN THOUGH THE EVENTS AT ISSUE PRE-DATE ENACTMENT OF THE
STATUTE.

Although the CDA was passed after the events described in the complaint
allegedly occurred, Section 230 of the CDA applies to this case. "A statute does not operate
'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the
statute's enactment or upsets expectations based in prior law." Landgyaf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1499 (1994) (citation omitted). In fact, applying a statute to
antecedent events "often serve [s] entirely benign and legitimate purposes"such as giving
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"comprehensive effect to a new law Congress considers salutary." Id. at 1498. Accordingly,
Congress may "expressly prescribe[]" that a statute should govern suits involving antecedent
events, in which case courts must apply the statute to such suits. Id. at 1505.

Congress provided such an express prescription in Section 230. The statute
states that "[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section." 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(3). Given that
Zeran's suit was fIled after passage of the CDA, a straightforward interpretation of this
provision requires that this Court determine whether Zeran has brought a cause of action
under a state law that is inconsistent with Section 230 ..!Q1

Indeed, the language of Section 230(d)(3) must be read to govern even suits
pending at the time the CDA was enacted. If the section were interpreted to apply only to
suits filed after passage of the CDA, the clause "no liability may be imposed" would be
superfluous: the statutory prohibition against bringing any cause of action would already ban
all future suits -- and therefore the imposition of liability -- under state laws inconsistent with
Section 230. But a court must be "deep[ly] reluctan[t] to interpret a statutory provision so as
to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment." Pennsylvania Dept. of Public
Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990).

The clause "no liability may be imposed"

is most naturally given operative effect by interpreting it to prohibit damages under
inconsistent state laws in suits already pending when the statute was enacted -- suits that

The CDA was signed into law (and became immediately effective) on February
8, 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. Plaintiff did not commence this lawsuit until
April 23, 1996.

.!QI
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would not be covered by the statute's prohibition on future causes of action. Clearly, if
Section 230 applies to suits pending at the time the CDA was enacted, it must apply to all
cases filed after the date of enactment as well, even if such cases involve events occurring
before enactment. Thus, Section 230 applies to Zeran's suit.

Even if this Court were to conclude (contrary to the foregoing analysis) that
Congress did not expressly provide that Section 230 should apply to suits arising from
conduct occurring before passage of the CDA, the statute would still apply to this case
because it would not have a "retroactive effect." A statute has "retroactive effect" only if "it
would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past
conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Landgraf, 114
S. Ct. at 1505. Clearly, Section 230 does not meet either the second or third prongs of this
test because it neither "increasers] [any] party's liability" nor "impose[s] new duties" on
anyone. Thus, Zeran could escape applicability of Section 230 only under the fIrst prong of
the Landgraf test, which turns on whether application of the statute would "impair" his preexisting "rights" in April 1995.

In Landgraf, the Supreme Court made clear that a statute may be found

retroactive on the basis of "impairment of rights" only if certain types of rights are shown to
be at issue. The Court observed that "[t]he largest category of cases in which [it has] applied
the presumption against statutory retroactivity has involved new provisions affecting
contractual or property rights, matters in which predrctability and stability are of prime
importance." Id. at 1500. More generally, the Court approvingly quoted Justice Story's
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statement that a statute acts retroactively if it "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under existing laws." Id. at 1499 (emphasis added) (quoting Society for the Propagation of
the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F.Cas. 756, 767 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156)); see also id. at
1524 (Scalia, l, concurring) (describing majority opinion as having adopted a vested rights
criterion); Maitland v. University of Minnesota, 43 F.3d 357, 361 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994).111

Section 230 of the CDA does not impair any vested right possessed by Zeran.
At most, the statute removes Zeran's opportunity to rely on a rule of liability for interactive
service providers that had been accepted by only a single trial court under the law of a state
in which Zeran did not live. Zeran had no vested right in such a rule. Indeed, even a statute
that has the effect of eliminating a pending tort claim does not impair a vested right. See In
re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir. 1996), cert: denied, No. 96-730, 1996 WL 665357 (Jan.
13, 1997) (citing cases). A fortiori, a person has no vested right in a rule of liability it may
invoke in some future tort action, especially when that rule has not yet been accepted either
generally or in the jurisdiction whose law governs the action. Thus, Section 230 did not
impair any vested right possessed by Zeran, and it therefore does not have retroactive effect.

In the absence of such a retroactive effect, "a court should 'apply the law in
effect at the time it renders its decision. '" Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1501 (quoting Bradley v.

. To be sure, the Court noted later in its opinion in Landgraf that neither it nor
Justice Story had restricted the presumption against retroactivity to cases involving vested
rights. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1502 n.29. But that statement merely refers to both the
Court's and Justice Story's conclusion that a statute could also be found to have a retroactive
effect under two other prongs of analysis -- if the statute imposed new duties or increased a
party's obligations with respect to past transactions. See id. at 1499, 1505. As discussed
above, neither of those conditions applies to this case.

111
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Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)). In this case, that law includes Section
230's grant of immunity to interactive service providers such as AOL from tort liability for
content provided by others. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted and his complaint should be dismissed.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, AOL respectfully requests this court to grant
judgment on the pleadings in its favor and to dismiss Plaintiff s suit with prejUdice.

Respectfully submitted,

Lf!~£

~ara Need man Kline
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

KENNETH M. ZERAN,
Plaintiff,

v.
AMERICA ONLINE, INC.,
Defendant.

CIV-96-1564-A

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Defendant America Online, Inc. ("AOL") has filed a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., on the
basis that the communications Decency Act ("CDA"), 47 U.S.C § 230,
signed into law on February 8, 1996, bars the imposition of any
liability against AOL for events which occurred in April and May,
1995.
This case was originally filed in the united States District
Court for the western District of Oklahoma on April 23, 1996, and
on October 16, 1996, the case was transferred to this district upon
AOL's Motion to Transfer. At the time of the transfer, a Motion to
Dismiss was pending. AOL has now withdrawn that Motion and is
relying solely on its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and the
CDA as a basis for dismissal.

(AOL Mem. n. 6). The pertinent parts

of the withdrawn motion are resubmitted as Exhibits A, Band C to
1

the affidavit of Leo Kayser, III sworn to February 7, 1997, ("Kayser
Aff.") because of certain inconsistencies being taken now by AOL
compared with its withdrawn motion.
AOL now limits its grounds for judgment on the pleadings to an
erroneous argument that § 230 of the CDA effectively overrules that
part of cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), upon which plaintiff relies in asserting that AOL is subject
to the legal standard applied to libraries, book stores, newsstands
or other distributors of published material.
This brief will demonstrate that AOL has literally turned the
CDA on its head to argue an expansive safe harbor for AOL under the
CDA and has

similarly turned retroactivity/retrospectivity

law

inside out to argue that the CDA should be given retrospective
effect.
Because plaintiff is required by the nature of the arguments
outlined in AOL's brief to rely upon matters outside the Complaint
(as outlined below), this Motion should be converted into a Motion
for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 12(c).
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Complaint

The

contains

the

following

pertinent

allegations 1 :
5.

On April 25,

1995,

at 14:54:35 E.D.T.,

unknown to

1 Paragraphs 5, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 25, 28, and 33 were
verified as
true by plaintiff
in his
answers
to AOL's
Interrogatories, Interrogatory 1, attached as Exhibit 6 to the
Affidavit of James A. Ikard.
2

message for someone to contact him.
He also called AOL's legal
department at (703) 918-1495 and received no response.
3:30 P.M.
follow up
connected
situation,
plaintiff
situation.

14. He then called "Pamela R." again at approximately
P.D.T., [April 28, 1995] 1-800-877-6364, Ext. 488, to
on the earlier call.
She said two accounts had been
from area code (617). and were associated wi th the
but neither account was related.
She suggested that
call the police because of the seriousness of the

15. On April 28, 1995, at 16: 57: 52 EDT another AOL
posting appeared under "Ken Z033" for "Naughty Oklahoma Items",
with additional "Out of Stock" items listed and new items for sale,
and again announcing that "I will be donating $1 from every shirt
to the victims", and again directing callers to "Ask for Ken Due to
high demand please call back if busy." Plaintiff's business phone
number was again prominently featured.
25. [After the KRXO broadcast] Also on May 1, 1995,
plaintiff sent a letter by registered mail to Ms. Ellen Kirsh,
counsel to AOL, which letter was also faxed at 2:26 P.M. P.D.T. He
received no immediate response. • .
28. At 12:10 P.M. P.D.T. [May 2, 1995J, plaintiff called
AOL's legal department to speak to Ellen Kirsh. Plaintiff spoke
with Jane Church who said she would discuss the matter on behalf of
Ms. Kirsh. Ms. Church said she was not aware of the faxed letter of
May 1, 1995, and plaintiff faxed another copy. During this
conversation which lasted 25 minutes, all of the same information
previously conveyed to AOL was repeated. Ms. Church again promised
the postings would be removed relating to KENZ033 etc.
33. At 1:28 P.M. P.D.T., [May 5, 1995J plaintiff again
called Jane Church who arranged a twenty minute conference call
with Peter Hippalier, Scott---, and Jean stevens. Again they said
all material would be removed. Again plaintiff gave them all the
information about the posting repeating its "handle".
LIABILITY ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff's Complaint sets out liability allegations as well:
42. Defendant AOL, as of 4:45 P.M. P.D.T., April 25,
1996, upon being notified by plaintiff that the incendiary,
defamatory and bogus posting using plaintiff's first name, -Ken-,
and using plaintiff's telephone number was in fact a hoax, had a
duty to plaintiff to take reasonable care to remove the posting
promptly, to notify its subscribers that the posting was bogus by
placing a notice on its service, including appending such an alert
to the original posting and any subsequent postings, and to execute
safeguards to prevent a reporting of plaintiff's name and telephone
4

,.

nwnber. 2
43. Defendant AOL, on information and belief, even
though it was on constructi ve notice by reason of the law
enunciated in cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. et al., 776 F.Supp.
1525 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), that it was obligated after due notice to be
able to screen incendiary, defamatory and/or bogus material posted
on its computer bulletin board service, as of April 25, 1995, had
failed to implement an effective screening capability upon receipt
of due notice. 3
44. On information and belief, the technology was
available to defendant AOL to have had in place, as of April 25,
1995, the capability to screen out postings based upon a name
and/or telephone number and/or key words or phrases.
45. Defendant AOL, therefore, failed to meet the proper
standard of care reasonably expected of a substantial commercial
operator of a computer bulletin board in its failure to have in
place and readily available appropriate screening capability.
ADDITIONAL MATTERS
In addition to the letters attached to the Kayser affidavit,
the following undisputed facts bear on the pending Motion:
1. A copy of the May 1, 1995, letter from plaintiff to Ellen
Kirsh of AOL is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Ikard Aff.

2 As noted below, AOL did delete the posting (although long
overdue) and canceled the bogus membership (see footnote 3, infra).
However, the only "content" AOL was required to screen for was
plaintiff's phone number. Had AOL been able to prescreen attempts
to repost bombing-related items using plaintiff's phone number,
there would have been only one posting and it would have been
deleted within hours of the original posting.
3 AOL has confirmed that the postings were done by a person or
persons that obtained access to AOL as a new member utilizing a
false name, address, phone number and credit card number. A new
membership was opened using false information with new (deceptively
similar) screen names as soon as the previous membership was
terminated and then a new posting followed. (Exs. 3 and 4). Because
AOL allows an individual to have access to AOL before it has an
opportunity to confirm basic information, AOL is unable to identify
the person(s) that actually posted the bombing-related items and
the only remedy AOL provides is to terminate the bogus memberships.
(see Exs. 3, 4 and 5 and Ex. 6, answer to Interrogatory 3, # 15.).

5

2. A copy of a letter from Jane M. Church of AOL to plaintiff
dated May 17, 1995, is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Ikard Aff.
3. An excerpt from AOL's answers to Plaintiff's
Interrogatories is attached as Exhibit 3 to the Ikard Aff.

First

4. Documents produced by AOL in response to Plaintiff's First
Request for Production of Documents relating to the false screen
names used by one or more persons who made the posting in question
are attached as Exhibit 4 to the Ikard Aff.
5. Documents produced by AOL in response to Plaintiff's First
Request for Production of Documents relating to the AOL's member
policies are attached as Exhibit 5 to the Ikard Aff.

6. An excerpt from Plaintiff's answers to AOL's
Interrogatories is attached as Exhibit 6 to the Ikard Aff.

First

INTRODUCTION
Reduced to its simplest terms AOL's legal argument is (1) the
anonymous bogus AOL member was a "content provider II and the ads for
bombing-related items on AOL's bulletin board 4 was "information"
within the meaning of the CDA,

(2)

the

CDA provides that

an

interactive computer service cannot be liable as a publisher for
any information provided by another content provider,

(3) the CDA

bars plaintiff's negligence claims as the functional equivalent of
prohibited publisher liability, and (4) the CDA should be given
retrospective effect to apply to events that occurred before its
effective date.
Before reaching any of the other points raised in this brief,

4 This case involves postings sponsored on AOL's bulletin
boards ("BBS", messages generally available for review by other
subscribers, AOL Mem. 2), not electronic mail messages ("E-mail",
a
private
electronic
communication
addressed
to
specific
recipients, AOL Mem. 2).
6

,

.

plaintiff must address one particularly troubling assertion in the
brief. AOL is disingenuous in the extreme in its insinuation that
"Perhaps recognizing the futility of a straightforward defamation
action in the face of section 230, Zeran has pleaded his claim
against AOL as sounding in simple negligence, not defamation" and
that the court should do as other courts have "routinely rejected
attempts by creative litigants to evade the many protections that
the law affords to defamation defendants by repackaging defamation
claims in the guise of other torts." (AOL Mem. 13),
The letter from Leo Kayser, III to Jane M. Church of AOL dated
June 26, 1995 5 , (Ex. D to Kayser Aff.) made it clear months before
the CDA was adopted that the plaintiff was not seeking to hold AOL

liable as a publisher for defamation, but rather for its negligence
in failing to take reasonable steps to delete the bogus posting and
keep them off AOL. (Ex. 0, p. 5). Again, in reply to Ms. Church's
letter to Mr. Kayser of July 13, 1995, Mr. Kayser asserted that AOL
had a duty to take appropriate action after being placed on notice
of "phony, derogatory and obviously potentially damaging postings
relating to a specific individual at a specific phone number." such
as a block on elements of the posting to keep it from reappearing.
(August 4, 1995, letter, Ex. E to Kayser Aff., page 2.) From these
two

letters

it

is

obvious that plaintiff's counsel

(al though

hopefully "creative") have, rather than "repackaging" plaintiff's
5 This letter contains a lengthy description of events all
which ended up almost verbatim in the Complaint filed against
first, Diamond Broadcasting (see Ex. B to AOL's Brief in Support of
Its Rule 12 Motion To Dismiss Or In the Alternative, To Transfer)
and then AOL itself.

J

7

claim,

consistently

taken

the

position

articulated

in

the

complaint, without any regard to § 230 (which did not even exist
until months later).
I.

SECTION 230 OP THB CDA DOBS NOT
ALTER THB CUBBY, INC. ANALYSIS

The complaint makes it clear that the duty of AOL to Zeran
arises only after AOL had received actual notice of the bogus and
manifestly injurious posting.

Cubby, Inc., supra, at 139-141. In

Cubby, Inc. CompuServe acknowledged that as a distributor rather
than a

publisher,

it would have been

liable for

a

defamatory

statement if it had known of such statements:
CompuServe further contends that, as a distributor of
Rumorville, it cannot be held liable on the libel claim
because it neither knew nor had reason to know of the
allegedly defamatory statements." Id. at 139. (Emphasis
added. )
The Complaint does not aver that AOL is a publisher,

but

rather alleges facts which set forth a claim under the standard of
a distributor, a standard which is met when the distributor has
actual knowledge prior to its duty's arising.

As the Cubby, Inc.

court stated:
The requirement that a distributor must have
knowledge of the contents of a publication
before
liability
can
be
imposed
for
distributing that publication is deeply rooted
in the First Amendment, made applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 139. (Emphasis added.)
The case at bar does not impose upon AOL any obligation
to examine in advance any material posted on its computer bulletin
board; instead, the Complaint pointedly avers that AOL's duty to

)

8

plaintiff arose only after actual notice of the offensive, bogus
posting specifically identified herein.
contrary to the arguments proffered by AOL, the CDA expressly
encourages AOL and other commercial operators of computer bulletin
boards to use blocking and screening techniques.

section 230(c)

provides in pertinent part as follows:
(c) Protection for
Offensive Material --

Good Samaritan' Blocking and Screening of

(1) Treatment of Publisher or Speaker -No
provider
or
user
of
an
interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided
by
another
information
content
provider.
(2) Civil Liability - No provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of -(A) any action voluntarily taken in
good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or
not
such
material
is
constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or
make
available
to
information
content providers or others the
technical means to restrain access
to material described in paragraph
(1) •

The CDA expressly provides under subsection (d) Effect on
other Laws:
(3) State Law -- Nothing in this sUbsection
shall be construed to prevent any State from
enforcing any state law that is consistent
9

with this section ...
What section 230(c)

does

is,

as

acknowledged by AOL

itself in its withdrawn Brief, Exhibit A, pp.17-18, Kayser Aff., p.
3, confirm the law enunciated in Cubby, Inc.

It eliminated the

risk that a cyberspace distributor might be treated legally as a
publisher and be exposed to strict liability as a publisher for
false or defamatory subject matter. 6
section

203(C)

overrules

stratton

Oakmont,

Inc.

V.

Prodigy Service Co., 1995 WL 323710 (Sup. ct. N.Y. May 24, 1995),
as correctly pointed out by AOL (Mem. 11), where a court held that
a cyberspace distributor, in part because it was pre-screening some
content for distasteful words,
strictly liable for
bulletin boards.

false

was held to be a publisher and

information published on one of its

No prior notice to Prodigy of the alleged false

information had been given to Prodigy by Stratton
Oakmont or anyone else.

section 230(c) (2)

expressly provides a

"safe harbor" for cyberspace distributors to edit without being
held to such strict publishers' liability.

6 In short, Congress clearly was concerned that the unintended
effect of Prodigy would be to compel interactive computer services
to do nothing about online content; instead, the CDA was adopted to
encourage each interactive computer service to "edit content"
without prior notice-but not be required to run the risk that by so
doing it would become strictly liable. The very title of the
subsection "Protection of Good Samaritan' Blocking and Screening of
Offensive Material" (emphasis added) confirms this. Contrary to
AOL's argument, § 230 of the CDA was adopted to protect action
taken by a provider such as AOL, not reward AOL for its inaction
(either by failing to take technical steps before or technical
fixes after) once it was notified of defamatory content. It is for
this reason that earlier in this brief plaintiff contended that AOL
was standing the CDA on its head.

10
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AOL is in error in arguing (AOL Mem. 8) that "Zeran's suit,
which attempts to impose on AOL damages that allegedly were caused
by messages posted on AOL's system by another person, seeks to have
this Court "treat" AOL "as the publisher or speaker" of those
messages.

The law makes a material distinction between the strict

liability applied to a publisher and the standard of liability
imposed

on a

cyberspace distributor,

which

is

the analogous

standard for a public library, book store or newsstand, a standard
that requires actual knowledge of the offending material and only
thereafter that a reasonable effort be made to remove such material
and prevent its being put back. Accord Cubby, Inc., supra at 140:
Technology
is
rapidly
transforming
the
information industry. A computerized database
is the functional equivalent of a more
traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent
application of a lower standard of liability
to an electronic news distributor such as
CompuServe than that which is applied to a
public library, book store, or newsstand would
impose an undue burden on the free flow of
information.
Given
the
relevant
First
Amendment considerations,
the appropriate
standard of liability to be applied to
CompuServe is whether it knew or had reason to
know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville
statements.
Where the standard is whether AOL knew or had reason to know,
(the Complaint avers actual notice), AOL is not being treated to
legal

liability

distributor.

as

a

publisher

or

speaker,

but

rather

as

a

That the CDA does not alter the Cubby, Inc. analysis,

but rather embodies it and encourages use of blocking technology is
discussed in Note, Establishing Legal Accountability For Anonymous
communi cation

In

Cyberspace,

96
11

Colum.L.Rev.

1526,

1550-1555

, I

(1996).

The

distinction,

which

is

made

in

Cubby,

Inc.,

is

consistent with the law in every jurisdiction in the United states.
Kayser

Aff.

at

p.4.

AOL

has

proffered

no

case

law

in

any

jurisdiction to the contrary.
Contrary to AOL's assertion that plaintiff's damages are
the same as if AOL were a publisher, AOL Mem. 8, it is AOL's own
negligent conduct in failing to take appropriate or sufficient
remedial action after having received notice of the bogus postings
which proximately caused the injury to plaintiff.

In the same

manner, AOL is not being held liable for the messages themselves as
it argues, but rather for failure to take appropriate action to
block the posting after actual notice.
While AOL does not concede that applicable state or local
laws would otherwise permit Zeran's negligence action, defendant
has withdrawn its challenge to the actual negligence claim.
only asserts as an affirmative defense §

230 (c),

It now

which is not

applicable for the reasons stated above.
AOL's generalized policy argument overlooks section 502
amending section 223 (47 U.S.C. § 223) of the CDA:
(e) In addition to any other defenses available by law:
(1) No person shall be held to have violated
subsection (a) and (b) solely for providing
access or connection to or form a facility,
system or network not under that person's
control, including transmission, downloadi ng,
intermediate storage, access software, or
other related capabilities that are incidental
to providing such access or connection that
does not include the creation of the content
of the communication. (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, it is averred that AOL should have been in a
12
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position

after

notice

to

control

the

bogus

postings

on

its

sponsored bulletin board.
Treating AOL as a cyberspace distributor, with the standard of
its

conduct

measured

by

analogy

to

libraries,

newsstands,

bookstores and the like, is entirely consistent with the CDA. The
CDA

does

not

exempt

cyberspace

distributors

from

traditional

liability standards imposed on distributors. Robust and vibrant
discourse over computer networks are unaffected.

Operators of BBS

such as AOL must take action only after actual and specific notice
has

been

liability

given

and

AOL

once

its

does

is

expressly

implement

exempted

some

from

screening

publisher
or

editing

function ("Blocking" and "Screening") to comply with the notice.
Nor does Zeran seek government regulation. His claim sounds in
common law negligence,

which is respected in every common law

jurisdiction in the united states. The negligence of a distributor
is actionable in every jurisdiction. The importance of Congress'
decision to let state law continue to impose traditional liability
standards on cyberspace distributors is highlighted since AOL is
unable to identify the poster of material on its BBSs when they use
fictitious/bogus screen names. No remedy whatsoever would exist for
persons

injured by the poster of such material,

if AOL,

after

notice,

had no responsibility to delete and block reposting of

defamatory, bogus material such as has occurred in the case at bar.
Congress surely did not leave Zeran alone to chase a "culpable
developer and publisher of the unlawful content" who cannot be
identified by name, address or phone number and located because of
13

. f

common law jurisdictions of the united states.
Prosser and Keeton On Torts, Negligence
Standard at 193-197

(5th Ed 1984).

§

See generally:

33 Application of the

Cubby.

Inc.

stands for the

legal standard applied to computer bulletin boards distributors to
establish a duty.
What makes the case at bar significant is that it will be the
first time that a jury will be able to listen to all the evidence
and decide what is the appropriate standard of care that AOL and
other commercial BBS sponsors should meet to prevent injury after
receiving notice that a bogus defamatory posting is occurring and
may recur. Thus, while AOL is correct in asserting that Cubby, Inc.
does not address the standard of care applicable to AOL's BBSs,
plaintiff's complaint avers what that standard is,

and if AOL

disagrees, as apparently it does, this is the factual dispute that
plaintiff intends to place before the jury,

and in fact has a

Seventh Amendment constitutional right to do so.
In cubby.

Inc.

the court held there was not a sufficient

factual basis to hold CompuServe to a standard of a distributor
since it was undisputed that CompuServe had no knowledge,

nor

should it have known, of the defamatory nature of the posting in
question.
motion,

In the case at bar,
no

factual

dispute

distributorship liability,

at least for purposes of this
exists

that

for

purposes

of

AOL had actual notice of the bogus,

defamatory posting as of April 25,

1~95.

AOL totally misstates the holding of Cubby,
Mem. 16) when it argues:
15

Inc.

(AOL

..

AOL's

practices

(see

n.

supra),

6,

when

Zeran

gave

prompt,

appropriate notice to AOL, the distributor.
A. AOL Is Not Sued as a Publisher
AOL is correct when it asserts that it is not being sued
as

a

publisher

for

defamation

based

upon

a

strict

liability

standard directed at the content. The issue for a claim against a
distributor, is what is the appropriate standard of care to prevent
distribution of libelous, defamatory or bogus material which is
obviously injurious after receiving notice that the distributor is
distributing such material?
All of the cases cited by AOL (AOL Mem. 13-14) are claims
made against publishers, in which the standard of liability as to
a publisher cannot be circumvented by a proffered cause of action
different from libel or defamation such as intentional infliction
of emotional distress or false
engaging in any such sophistry.

light averments.

Zeran is not

His complaint asserts a common law

negligence claim against AOL as a distributor, not a publisher and
the issue is whether the distributor, once it has a duty to Zeran
based

upon

notice

of

its

distribution

of

bogus,

defamatory

material, exercised reasonable care to prevent further injury to
plaintiff Zeran.
The issue of standard of care is one generally left to a jury
in a negligence case, once the Court determines that a duty arises.
The question of whether duty arises is based upon the question of
foreseeability.

Once actual notice

foreseeability is established.

is given to

a

distributor,

This is very old settled law in all
14
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Thus, far from supporting Plaintiff's claim against AOL,
cubby is representative of a more general common law rule
that a mere distributor of information supplied by third
parties may not be held liable for injury caused by
dissemination of that information in the
absence of
facts establishing that it was a
publisher of the
information.
Cubby is in fact representative of the general common law
rule, which the Cubby court expressly states in its opinion, that
a mere distributor of information supplied by third parties may not
be

held

liable

for

injury

caused

by

dissemination

of

that

information in the absence of facts establishing that it,

as a

distributor, knew or should have known of the defamatory nature of
the posting. Cubby, Inc. , supra at 140.
The cases cited by AOL

(AOL Mem.

16)

in fact support

plaintiff's legal position for holding that AOL, after learning of
the

bogus,

Zeran,

defamatory and

had a

inflammatory posting

duty to remove same effectively.

sophistry to argue,

as AOL does,

from
It

plaintiff

is actually

that a distributor held to be

responsible for bogus and defamatory material because it had actual
knowledge of it,

and still failed to take adequate reasonable

precautions, and thus may be deemed to have "published" it,

is

converted itself from a distributor to a publisher. The same is
true for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 577(2)

(1977), upon

which AOL relies.
To subject AOL to liability for unreasonably failing to remove
defamatory material that it knows is being widely disseminated and
may subject it to liability for "its continued publication", does
not make AOL a publisher. AOL's reliance upon Prosser and Keeton on
16
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the Law of Torts, §113, at 803 (5th Ed. 1984) is the best support
yet

for

the

Libraries,

general
news

"publishers".
as

BBS

common

vendors

law support
and

other

for

the

Cubby court.

disseminators

are

not

Libraries, news vendors and other disseminators such

operators

in

cyberspace

are

potentially

"secondary

publishers", an entirely distinct category from a publisher, and
section 230(c) (2) encourages them to be responsible and quick to
edit and block defamatory and other objectionable matter, even at
their own initiative and discretion, without subjecting themselves
to the status of a publisher.

Under section 230 of the CDA AOL

remains, notwithstanding its decision to block or edit specific
postings -- a mere distributor -- without the threat that the
reasoning

in

stratton

Oakmont,

supra,

had

imposed

prior

to

enactment of the CDA. If the court agrees that the section 230(C)
does not bar plaintiff's negligence action against AOL in its
capacity as a distributor, it need not go to the second part of
this Memorandum of Law, which discusses the law on the issue of
retroacti vi ty ,

since the CDA was enacted well after the facts

giving rise to plaintiff's claims.
II.

THE CDA DOES NOT HAVB RETROSPECTIVE EPPECT ON THE EVENTS
WHICH GIVE RISE TO AOL'S STATB TORT LIABILITY.

The events which give rise to negligence liability for AOL
under traditional state tort concepts occurred in April and May,
1995. The CDA was signed into law in February, 1996. Long prior to
adoption of the CDA,

plaintiff was setting forth the operative

facts of this case and asserting his entitlement to damages from
17
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AOL under theories of liability then cognizable. (see the Complaint
and Exs. D and E to Kayser Aff.).7 Nevertheless, AOL asserts that
the CDA should be applied retrospectively to dismiss this Complaint
and effectively bar all recovery by plaintiff for the injuries he
suffered at the hands of AOL's negligence by the creation of an
all-inclusive,

safe

harbor

fashioned

from

§

230.

As

outlined

earlier, AOL's reading of the applicability and scope of the CDA to
this case is seriously flawed-in effect turning the purpose of the
CDA on

its

head.

retrospectively

to

Similarly,
this

case

AOL's
is

attempt to

predicated

employ

on

a

the

CDA

fundamental

misapplication of the Supreme Court's recent decisions and the
interpretation of those cases by the lower courts. Indeed, with the
sole exception of jurisdictional or procedural matters,
these

decisions

deny retrospecti ve

effect

to

the

all of

statutes

in

question.
The

starting

point

on

any

retroactivity/retrospectivity

analysis is whether the purported application of the statute is
truly retroactive:
The
terms
' retroacti ve'
and
' retrospective'
are
synonymous in judicial usage....
They describe acts
which operate on transactions which have occurred or
rights and obligations which existed before passage of
the act.
2 N.
Singer,
Sutherland on Statutory
Construction § 41.01, p. 337 (5th rev. ed. 1993) cited in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.ct.
1483, 1498 n. 23 (1994).
The Landgraf case is the most recent major application of
7 As noted above in footnote 5, plaintiff sued Diamond
Broadcasting in January, 1996, (before the effective date of the
CDA), setting forth operative facts identical to those in the
plaintiff's complaint against AOL.
18

.'

retroactivity to an existing statute. In Landgraf and its companion
case,

Rivers v.

Roadway Exp.,

Inc.,

114 S.ct.

1510

(1994), the

Court considered whether two sections of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 should be given retroactive effect to a decision on appeal.
The initial inquiry is whether Congress has provided for such
a retroactive effect. The court observed:
When a case implicates a federal statute
enacted after the events in suit, the court's
first task is to determine whether Congress
has expressly prescribed the statute's p~oper
reach. If Congress has done so, of course,
there is no need to resort to judicial default
rules. Id. at 1505.
In Landgraf the court meticulously reviews the legislative
history

and

statutory

language

of

the

civil

Rights

Act

and

determines that Congressional intent to apply the new provisions
retroactively is not justified. Id, at 1489-96.
In its memorandum, AOL proposes that the very creation of the
bar to liability by

§

230(d) (3) of the CDA ("no cause of action may

be brought and no liability may be imposed under any state or local
law that is inconsistent with this section")

"must be read to

govern even suits pending at the time the CDA was enacted.",
especially to avoid rendering the "no liability" superfluous. (AOL
Mem. 18). These arguments were rejected by the Court in Landgraf.
The court observed:
A statement that a statute will become
effective on a certain date does not even
arguably suggest that it has any application
to conduct that occurred at an earlier date.
Id. at 1491.
Thus, AOL cannot argue simply that by adopting an effective date of
19

the litigation/liability ban Congress intended that the CDA should
be applied retroactively.
Next, the court rejected the argument that retroactivity was
required to avoid making some language in the Act superfluous. Id.
at 1494.

AOL's tautology is comparable-Congress would not have

barred liability ("no liability may be imposed") unless it intended
to effect events that preceded the effective date

of the CDA

because it would otherwise render the bar "superfluous". Of course,
Congress easily could have, as it did in the civil Rights Act of
1991, adopt the change in policy and decline to give it retroactive
effect-meaning that the effective date does not render the bar
"superfluous"-it merely reflects congressional will.
The Landgraf Court noted that Congress had ample opportunity
to make express provision for retroactive effect of the civil
Rights Act. ("an important and easily expressed message concerning
the Act's effect on pending cases") Id. at 1495. AOL does not argue
that Congress has specifically provided for retroactive effect of
§

230 of the CDA-and Congress undoubtedly could have done so.8
Additionally,

the

court declined

to

interpret the Act's

creation of new remedies as requiring retroactivity even though
many of the sections of the Act were explicitly designed to reverse

8 e.g. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act did
provide express retroactivity for capital cases in § 107(a) which
"shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of
this Act", but predicated this upon establishment by a state of a
procedure to ensure the appointment of qualified counsel to
represent
indigent
petitioners
in
state
post-conviction
proceedings. see Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1342 (4th Cir.
1996)
20

a long list of Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 1489-90. Obviously,
desiring to

reverse

the

effect

of

a

state

court decision

in

stratton Oakmont does not equate to the expression of retroactive
intent by Congress on the CDA.
Finally,
through

in the absence of express Congressional intent or

application

of

the

rules

of

statutory

interpretation

retroactivity is not found, then other rules must be looked to:
When, however, the statute contains no such
express command, the court must determine
whether the new statute would have retroactive
effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a
party possessed when he acted, increase a
party's liability for past conduct, or impose
new duties with respect to transactions
already completed.
If the statute would
operate
retroactively,
our
traditional
presumption teaches that it does not govern
absent clear congressional intent favoring
such a result. Id. at 1505.
These principles mandate that the CDA not be given retroactive
effect.
The Landgraf court starts with the general proposition that
"the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted
in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older
than our Republic." Id. at 1497.
While

it

is

true

that

"[a]

statute

does

not

operate

retrospectively merely because it is applied in a case arising from
conduct

antedating

the

statute's

enactment

or upsets

expectations based in prior law", the court must "ask whether the
new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed
before its enactment." Id. at 1499.
Whether

§

230 of the CDA operates retroactively "comes at the
21

end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of
the change in the law and the degree of connection between the
operation of the new rule and a relevant past event." Id.
The Court expressed the general guiding principle that
But while the constitutional impediments to
retroactive civil legislation are now modest,
prospectivity remains the appropriate default
rule. Because it accords wi th widely held
intuitions about how statutes ordinarily
operate, a presumption against retroactivity
will generally coincide with legislative and
public expectations. Requiring clear intent
assures that Congress itself has affirmatively
considered
the
potential
unfairness
of
retroactive application and determined that it
is an acceptable price to pay for the
countervailing benefits. Such a requirement
allocates to Congress responsibility for
fundamental policy judgments concerning the
proper temporal reach of statutes, and has the
additional virtue of giving legislators a
predictable background rule against which to
legislate. Id. at 1501.
Since Landgraf was decided, the courts have uniformly declined
to give retroactive effect to federal statutes.

In Maitland v.

University o f Minnesota, 43 F.3d 357, 361-3. (4th Cir. 1994), the
court reversed, declining to give retroactive effect to

108 of

§

the civil Rights Act of 1991 which prohibited an employee from
challenging a litigated or consent judgment or order. The court
noted that "Had Maitland known that the law would change and that
he might be barred by

subsequent legislation

from bringing a

lawsuit to challenge actions taken under the consent decree, it is
probable that he would have taken a much more active role in the
Rajender

case."

"attaching

'new

Id.

at

legal

363.

The

court

consequences'
22

found
to

that

§

108 was

Maitland's

limited

participation in the consent decree proceedings" and was therefore
prohibited by Landgraf. Id.
In Rafferty v. City of youngstown, 54 F.3d 278, 290 ft. 1 (6th
Cir.

1995),

the Court followed Maitland,

supra, and refused to

prohibit certain police officers from challenging conduct which was
also covered by a consent decree.
In Preston v. Com. of Va. ex reI. New River Community College,
31

F.3d

203

(4th

Cir.

1994),

the

Circuit

declined

to

give

retroactive effect to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as it relates to
a private cause of action under Title IX, 20 U.S.C § 1681(a}. The
court was faced with deciding whether Title IX should be construed
as Title VII existed at the time the events occurred or as Title
VII was subsequently amended. The court determined that the 1991
amendments should not be given retroactive effect on Title IX since
it "altered the legality of the employer's conduct and thus affixes

new legal consequences to past conduct.

Id.

at 208.

(emphasis

added) .
In Bohrman v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 926 F. Supp. 211

(D. Me. 1996), the court declined to give retroactive effect to
amended federal regulations 9 and instead applied regulations in
effect at the time students

wer~

exposed to radioactive gas during

a tour of a nuclear power plant, citing Landgraf.
In a

case

invol ving the classic rule

against retroactive

9
Plaintiff sought to take advantage of the amended
regulations which made the duty owed to a member of the public
uniform regardless of whether the person is in a restricted area.
Id. at 218; see 219 n. 6 for impact of ruling on applicable
exposure limits.
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impact on contracts, the court in
Radioactive Waste Com'n v.
Pa.1995),

declined

to

give

O'Leary,

Appalachian states Low-Level
932 F.Supp.

retroactive

effect

646,
to

654

(M.D.

regulations

relating to rebates of certain surcharges for disposal of low-level
nuclear wastes. 10
In Travenol Laboratories.

Inc. v. U.S.

,

936 F.Supp.

1020,

11024 (CIT 1996), the court declined retroactive effect to a NAFTA
provision on the amount of interest due on excess deposits of
estimated duties, citing Landgraf. 11
The

Prison

Litigation Reform Act

S

803 (d)

which

limited

attorney's fees in prison cases was denied retroactive effect in
Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir. 1996) since it would
attach new consequences to completed conduct.
In u.s. v. Bacon, 82 F.3d 822,824 (9th Cir. 1996), the court
refused to apply Washington's four year extinguishment provision in
its Fraudulent Conveyances Act retroactively since the Act imposed
an

additional

element

for

a

fraudulent

transfer

claim

and

impermissibly "changes the elements of a cause of action".
In McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.2d 1236, 140-41 (6th Cir. 1995), an
amendment which added a prohibition of the interception of cordless

10 The Secretary of DOE imposed a three year requirement for
a contract to qualify for a full rebate. The plaintiff's contract
was for less than three years and DOE proposed to pay a pro rata
amount. Id. at 651.
11 If the NAFTA amendments were enforced to declarations made
before the effective date, the government would be required to pay
interest on excess tariffs when before NAFTA it did not. Id. at
1022-23.
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telephone communications was not given retroactive effect to a
claim

for

damages

for

the

interception

of

cordless

phone

conversations. 12
Forfeiture of laundered funds under a new federal statute 13
was rebuffed in

u.s.

v. $814,254.76, in

u.s.

Currency, contents of

valley Nat. Bank Account No., 51 F.3d 207 (9th Cir. 1995).
Numerous courts have denied retroactivity to the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act because of the profound legal
consequences on federal habeas proceedings from attaching new legal
consequences to a completed event. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856,
862

(7th Cir. 1996), Burns v. Parke, 95 F.3d 465, 468

1996), and Boria

V.

(7th eire

Keane, 90 F.3d 36, 37-8 (2nd Cir. 1996).14

AOL's reliance is misplaced on In Re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106 (3rd
Cir. 1996) as supporting its assertion that "even a statute that
has the effect of eliminating a pending tort claim does not impair
a vested right" within the Landgraf policy analysis. (AOL Mem. 20).

12 Under the prior act in effect at the time the events
transpired, interception of cordless phone conversations as radio
waves were not prohibited. Id. at 1240-41.
13 Under the old forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. S 981, funds
seized could be forfeited only if they were "involved in" money
laundering "traceable" to the transactions. The amended statute,
adopted after the seizure of the funds, permits the forfeiture of
money even if not directly traceable to laundered funds so long as
the account previously contained funds involved in or traceable to
illegal activity. Id. at 208.
14
Since Virginia had not established the required system
before the petitioner's state post-conviction proceedings were
instituted, S 107 of the Act was deemed not to apply; the court
deferred a decision on the retroactive effect to the other sections
of the Act. Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d at 1342-43, n. 3; see n.
8, supra.
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TMI

involved

the

application

of

a

statute

of

limitations

retroactively to comport with express language in the statute as to
jurisdiction

and,

as

a

result,

choice

of

law

(which

applied

Pennsylvania's limitations to Mississippi suits) for the Three Mile
Island cases. Id. at 1115 n. 8. The court did hold that a pending
tort claim is not a

vested right

for purposes of

"heightened

scrutiny" due process review. 1S It does not follow that a pending
tort claim has no status in the Landgraf analysis which focuses on
the fundamental fairness of retroactivity. Moreover,

it is well

settled that a new statute of limitations generally does not even
constitute retroactive application since it does not relate to the
(

conduct of the defendant, but rather the plaintiff's conduct in
filing the claim. Forest v. U.S. Postal Service, 97 F.3d 137, 140
(6th eire

1996). For example,

in Forest the court retroactively

applied the 90 day statute of limitations in the 1991 Civil Rights
Act

instead

Additionally,

of

the

Forest

prior

30

recounts

day
that

statute
many

for

other

a

claim.

decisions

Id.
have

imposed the new 90 day statute for cases arising under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act involving conduct that predated
the 1991 Act. Id. at 140-41.

IS As noted above, the Landgraf court based its analytic
framework on the observation that "constitutional impediments to
retroactive civil legislation are now modest." Landgraf at 150l.
ThUS, it should come as no surprise that depriving a plaintiff of
the right to file suit because the statute of limitations had run
does not violate due process. Nevertheless, this retroactive
application of limitations (assuming it is deemed to be truly
retroactive) might well not pass muster under the focus of the
Landgraf
test-the
"potential
unfairness
of
retroactive
application." Id. at 1501.
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AOL has argued that plaintiff's right to damages for its
negligence is not the type of "right" entitled to protection from
retroactive application of the CDA. (AOL Mem. 19-20). AOL seizes on
the mention of the paradigm for declining retroactivity-contracts
or "vested" rights. While Landgraf does refer to those as the wellrecognized category of contracts/vested rights, Landgraf emphasizes
the

that

"[a]ny

disagreement
enormous

in

test
hard

variety

clarity."

of

Landgraf

linchpin

of

any

of

retroactivity

cases,
legal

at

and

is

changes

1499.

unlikely
with

Indeed,

retroactivity

considerations of fair notice,

will

room

for

to

classify the

perfect

philosophical

Landgraf

analysis

leave

is

emphasizes
that

reasonable reliance,

the

"familiar
and settled

expectations offer sound guidance." Id.
In Landgraf the court invoked the unfairness of imposing "an
important new legal burden" to the conduct in question, that the
introduction of compensatory damages that would have "an impact on
private parties' planning", and as creating a new cause of action
"its

impact on parties'

rights

is especially pronounced".

AOL

appears to argue that retroactively (i.e. after all of the seminal
events have been completed)

effecting the elements of causes of

action (or completely eliminating all available causes of action)
is different if the party is a plaintiff than if it is a defendanta

one

way

Landgraf

)

street

court

over which

makes

no

such

only defendants may
distinction
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and

travel.

neither

do

The
its

progeny. 16
Moreover,

Landgraf focuses on the "potential unfairness of

retroactive application" Id. at 1501. Based upon the facts of this
case it would be extremely unfair to dismiss plaintiff's claims
under the retroactive imposition of § 230. These include:
1.

plaintiff took

immediate

action to

notify AOL of

the

incendiary posting and followed it up with many communications to
AOL -t o remove the posting and avoid others

from being posted

(infra, 3-4);
2. AOL failed to take prompt action on plaintiff's request to
remove the posting, refused to post a retraction or notice that the
posting was false, and failed to take steps to preclude repostings

(supra, 4-5,
3.

~~

Because

42-45);
of

the

manner

in

which AOL

solicits

its

new

members, AOL was (and remains to this day) unable to identify those
who join using bogus information; the person(s) who posted the KenZ
postings changed his bogus information at least twice and used new
(deceptively similar) screen names. (see Exs. 3, 4 and 5 and Ex. 6,
answer to Interrogatory 3, # 15.).
4. Plaintiff's counsel asserted from the earliest time that
AOL was liable as a distributor and not a publisher, establishing
plaintiff's reliance on the law as it undeniably existed prior to
16 e.g. Rafferty, supra, and Maitland, supra, which declined
to deprive plaintiffs of their claim by the retroactive effect of
§ 108 of the civil Rights Act of 1991; U.S. v. Bacon, supra, where
the court refused to apply a four year statute of repose
retroactively because it "impermissibly changes the elements of a
cause of action." Many of these cases invoke concern over
retroactively attaching new consequences to completed conduct.

)
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the adoption of the CDA (Exs. D and E to Kayser Aff.);
5. Before the effective date of the CDA, plaintiff instituted
an

action

over

damages

broadcast which was

a

arising
direct

from

and

the

Oklahoma

foreseeable

City

result

radio

of AOL's

negligence; the basic allegations in the Complaint against Diamond
Broadcasting, Inc. are identical to those in the Complaint against
AOL (see supra, n. 3).
6. All of the acts which give rise to AOL's tort liability
occurred (were completed) long before the adoption of the CDA.
In

light

Congressional

of

the

intent,

above,

especially

application of §

the

230

lack

of

express

of the CDA to the

plaintiff's claims would the unfair, would impose new burdens on
plaintiff's claims, change the elements of plaintiff's causes of
action, deprive plaintiff of any remedy for AOL's negligence which
directly and forseeably injured plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined in this brief, AOL's Motion should be
overruled. AOL seeks to use the CDA in a manner Congress did not
~nvision

and

for

purposes

directly

contrary

to

the

expressed

purpose of § 230 (i.e. protecting action, not inaction, since AOL
did not needed § 230's protection from the Prodigy case if it did
nothing!),

and

seeks

to

abrogate

well-recognized

state

tort

liability for distributors. Moreover, even if the CDA does apply to
plaintiff's type of claim.

it may not be applied retroactively

under the prevailing case law.
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IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

KENNETH M. ZERAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 96-1564-A

)
AMERICA ONLINE, INC.,

)

)
Defendant.

)
)

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant America Online, Inc.' s ("AOL")
motion for judgment on the pleadings fails to undercut the two basic points AOL established in
its opening brief: plaintiff's suit seeks to treat AOL as the "publisher or speaker" of third-party
information in contravention of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), 47
U.S.c. § 230, and Section 230 applies in this case even though the events in question pre-date its
enactment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's suit should be dismissed.

I.

PLAINTIFF'S SUIT SEEKS TO TREAT AOL AS A PUBLISHER OF TIllRD
PARTY CONTENT AND IS THEREFORE BARRED BY SECTION 230 OF THE
CDA.

In its opening brief, AOL established that Plaintiff's suit, which seeks to hold
AOL liable for harms resulting from allegedly defamatory messages posted by an unknown
third-party, is barred by Section 230 of the CDA, because the suit impermissibly seeks to treat

..

.,

(

(

AOL as the "publisher or speaker" of the messages. (Def. Mem. at 5-12Y) AOL demonstrated,
in particular, that the plain terms of Section 230 (id. at 6-8), as well as its legislative history and
overarching policy goals (id. at 9-12), all support AOL's construction ofthe statute. AOL
further explained that Plaintiff could not evade the bar of Section 230 merely by labeling his suit
as a claim of simple negligence rather than a claim of defamation or another similar tort. ad. at
12-17.) Plaintiff's opposition brief fails to refute AOL's construction and application of Section
230.

Despite his weak rhetoric that AOL has turned Section 230 "on its head," (PI. Opp. at 2,
10 n.6), Zeran does not contest the basic foundations of AOL's argument. Thus, he does not
dispute two key elements that make Section 230 control this case, namely (a) that AOL is a
"provider of an interactive computer service" within the meaning of Section 230(c)(I) (see Def.
Mem. at 7), and (b) that the messages over which Plaintiff has sued were "provided by another
information content provider" as defined in Section 230(e)(3). (See id.) Moreover, he concedes
both that Section 230 provides a "'safe harbor' for cyberspace distributors" (PI. Opp. at 10) and
that Section 230 bars any civil cause of action against a distributor if the imposition of liability
in that action would treat the distributor as the publisher or speaker of a message posted by a
third party. @)

Zeran's view of the operation of Section 230 diverges from that of AOL in only one
respect: whether his suit to hold AOL liable for allegedly failing to remove or block messages

In this Reply Memorandum, we cite AOL's "Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings" as "Def. Mem." and Plaintiff's "Brief in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings" as "PI. Opp."
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posted on its service by a third person "treat[s] [AOL] as the publisher" of those messages. AOL
demonstrated in its opening brief that holding AOL liable for the harm those third-party
messages allegedly caused to Zeran would treat AOL as the publisher of the messages from at
least three critical perspectives:
•

Holding AOL liable for the damages allegedly caused to Plaintiff by these
allegedly "defamatory and bogus" messages would put AOL in precisely the same
legal position as the person who posted -- and therefore published -- the
messages, thereby ''treat[ing] [AOL] as the publisher" of those messages. (Def.
Mem. at 8.)

•

Under well-settled common law principles, liability for harm flowing from the
dissemination of a defamatory statement may be imposed only upon a party who
is deemed to have "published" the statement. As a result, Plaintiff's suit
necessarily seeks to treat AOL as the publisher of the messages at issue. ad. at
12-17.)

•

Plaintiff's suit seeks to impose on AOL a standard of care requiring it to review
and edit the content of information appearing on its system and to issue
retractions for information deemed to be erroneous. Y These are the quintessential

At one point in his opposition, Zeran erroneously asserts that the standard of
care that he seeks to apply in this action would not treat AOL as a publisher because it "does not
impose upon AOL any obligation to examine in advance any material posted on its computer
bulletin board." (PI. Opp. at 8.) This is utterly inconsistent with the position that Zeran
advances throughout the remainder of his opposition. From the outset of this case, and
throughout his opposition, Zeran has argued that AOL, once put on notice of the first offending
message, was obligated to review in advance every subsequent message sought to be posted on
its system and to block any of them that repeated any similar offending content. (Complaint ~~
(continued ... )

Y
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duties of a publisher, and to impose them on AOL would obviously treat it as the
"publisher" of the information posted on its system by third parties. ad. at 8.)

A.

Distributors Cannot Be Liable for Harms Caused by Third Party Content
Without Beine Deemed Publishers of that Content.

Rather than confronting the foregoing arguments and the plain meaning of
Section 230, Zeran bases his opposition to AOL's motion principally on Cubby, Inc. v.
Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), a case decided by a district court in New
York several years before enactment of Section 230. Zeran erroneously argues that Cubby ruled
that an interactive computer service provider may be liable for harm caused by defamatory
infOrmation that a third party transmits over its service without treating the provider as the
publisher ofthe information. (PI. Opp. at 8, 11, 15-16.) He builds this argwnent upon the
demonstrably false premise that Cubby recognized a special cause of action -- wholly distinct
from defamation or other causes of action applicable to those who "publish" false information -for "negligent distribution" of defamatory information. QQ.) Zeran's interpretation of Cubby is
totally wrong.

Cubby did not even discuss, much less recognize, any cause of action that would
subject an interactive computer service to liability for defamatory information transmitted by a
third party without treating it as the publisher Qr speaker of that information. Instead, Cubby

( ... continued)
43-45 (AOL "was obligated after due notice to be able to screen incendiary, defamatory andlor
bogus material"); PI. Opp. at 7, 12, 13 (AOL "must implement some screening or editing
function" (emphasis added»).

Y
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recognized that interactive computer services, as mere distributors of information being
transmitted by third parties, enjoy as a matter of constitutional law a special level of protection
that requires an exceptional threshold showing before they can be treated as the publisher or
speaker of such information. Specifically, Cubby held that the First Amendment provides a
"deeply rooted" protection for distributors such as interactive service providers and that, as a
result, such a provider could be held liable as the publisher or speaker of defamatory matter
posted by a third party only upon a showing that it knew or should have known of the
defamation. 776 F. Supp. at 139-41. Zeran's attempt to transform this special level of protection
into a new-found tort action of "negligent distributipn" in which liability may be imposed on an
interactive computer service without treating it as a "publisher" is preposterous.

The plaintiff in Cubby sought to hold Compuserve liable under three different tort
theories, each of which plainly would have treated Compuserve as the publisher or speaker of
allegedly defamatory information posted by a third party. Cubby's primary claim was for
defamation, a tort whose most basic element is the requirement that the defendant have
"published" the information in question. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 558 (1977). In
discussing this claim, the Cubby court framed the issue as being whether there was a factual
basis for treating Compuserve as though it had "originally published" defamatory messages
posted by a third party. 776 F. Supp. at 139 (citation omitted, emphasis added). Similarly, in
considering the two other tort claims presented in Cubby -- business disparagement and unfair
competition -- the Court said that no liability could be imposed absent a showing that
Compuserve had made a "knowing publication of false matter," and that Compuserve had
"intentionally uttered" an injurious falsehood. rd. at 141, 142 (emphasis added).
-5-

(

(

Because holding Compuserve liable under each of the claims presented in Cubby
would by definition have treated Compuserve as a publisher of third-party content, Cubby cannot
possibly be interpreted as having invented a cause of action against interactive computer service
providers that would subject them to liability for third-party content without treating them as the
publishers of such content. Rather, as set out in AOL's opening brief (Def. Mem. at 15-16),
Cubby is representative of a more general common law rule under which a distributor cannot be
liable for harm caused by dissemination of third-party information in the absence of facts
establishing that it was a publisher of that informationY Accordingly, Cubby, lends absolutely
no support to, but instead highlights the fatal flaws in, Zeran's claim that his suit does not seek to
treat AOL as the "publisher or speaker" of the messages at issue in this caseY

Zeran's opposition completely ignores the cases cited by AOL on this point, yet at
the same time asserts that his unfoUnded interpretation of Cubby "is consistent with the law in
every jurisdiction in the United States." (PI. Opp. at 12.) Astonishingly, Zeran's sole support
for this breathtaking assertion is the ipse dixit of his own lawyer. (See id. ; Kayser Aff. 'j[5.)

'2.1

~

Zeran also errs in arguing that AOL's interpretation of Section 230 is somehow
inconsistent with a brief filed by AOL's predecessor counsel before this case was transferred to
. this Court. The only supposed inconsistency to which Plaintiff points -- that the brief supporting
AOL's now-withdrawn motion to dismiss "acknowledged" that Section 23 O(c) "confirm[ed] the
law enunciated in Cubby" (PI. Opp. at 10) -- is in fact consistent with AOL's position here.
AOL simply observed in that earlier brief that Section 230 "supports the decision in Cubby ....
It will, henceforth, protect services such as AOL from being treated as the publisher of
information posted on the net by others." (PI. Opp., Ex. A, at 17-18). This statement is fully
consistent with AOL's present position that Section 230, like the Cubby decision itself, extends
special protections to interactive computer services. In any event, even if this Court finds that
there is any inconsistency, nothing bars AOL from refining its legal theory during the progress of
this case. See -Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. v. William T. Burnett & Co., 691 F.2d 658, 664 (4th
Cir. 1983)
-6-
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Much of the remainder of Zeran's argument revolves around his contention that
his suit does not seek to treat AOL as the "publisher or speaker" of the allegedly defamatory
messages because his suit is not for defamation -- which ~e apparently concedes would be barred
by Section 230 -- but for simple negligence, which he contends is unaffected by Section 230.
Zeran's argument on this point goes immediately off track when he asserts, without citation to
any authority, that Section 230 was designed to immunize interactive computer services from the
"strict liability" to which publishers are held in defamation cases but to leave them unprotected
from negligence suits. (PI. Opp. at 10-11.) This construction of Section 230 is plainly wrong
because defamation itself is not a "strict liability" tort. To be held liable for defamation, a party
must have published allegedly defamatory information with a level of fault

am~unting

to at least

negligence. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 558, 580A, 580B; see also Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-47 (1974) (First Amendment generally requires showing offault
before defendant can be liable for defamation). It is therefore absurd to contend, as Plaintiff
does, that Congress enacted Section 230 to "protect" interactive computer services by shielding
them from "strict liability" but not "negligence liability."

More fundamentally, Plaintiff is wrong in asserting that his suit against AOL for
negligently failing to screen or remove defamatory information from its system is meaningfully
distinguishable from a defamation suit for publishing defamatory information. (Def. Opp. at 7.)
AOL"s opening brief has already established that if Section 230's applicability were to turn on
such superficial differences as how the claim is labeled, then it would provide no protection
whatsoever for interactive computer services. (Def. Mem. at 13.) Far from rebutting this point,
Zeran's brief simply confirms that his claim is, in substance, a claim for defamation. Thus, he
-7-
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repeatedly asserts that the "operative facts" and "basic allegations" in his suit against AOL are
"identical" to those of his defamation action against the owner of the radio station that broadcast
one ofthe messages at issue here. (pl. Opp. at 18 n.7, 29.)

Ultimately, Zeran's strained efforts to draw a distinction between his suit and a
suit for defamation, and to characterize his suit as one that does not seek to treat AOL as a
publisher of the allegedly defamatory messages, collapse of their own weight. Thus, by the end
of his discussion of how Section 230 operates, he concedes that his theory of liability would (1)
result in AOL being "deemed to have 'published'" the allegedly defamatory material (pl. Opp. at
16); (2) subject AOL "to liability for '[the messages'] continued pUblication'" (id.); and (3) treat
AOL as a "secondary publisher," a category that Zeran suggests, without authority, is "entirely
distinct" from (rather than a subset of) the category of "publisher." ad. at 17.) AOL submits
that these three concessions -- which Zeran remarkably makes in the course of accusing AOL of
"sophistry" -- are each sufficient to establish that Zeran's suit seeks impermissibly to "treat
[AOL] as the publisher or speaker" of the messages at issue.

B.

AOL's Interpretation of Section 230 Is In Harmony With the Purposes of
That Section.

Zeran further errs in arguing that AOL's interpretation of Section 230's
"publisher or speaker" provision is inconsistent with Congress's intent, reflected in Section
230(c)(2), to remove disincentives for interactive computer services to screen out potentially
harmful material posted by third persons. (See Pl. Opp. at 9-11.) AOL agrees that Congress
intended to remove legal disincentives to such voluntary "Good Samaritan" actions. At the same
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time, Congress plainly did not require that interactive computer services engage in reviewing and
screening, a fact reflected in both its express prohibition on treating them as "publishers" and its
unambiguous declaration that their development be "unfettered by Federal or State regulation."
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2)Y Under Plaintiff's theory, however, AOL would in fact be required, as
soon as it received some form of notice that a particular message was "bogus" or "defamatory,"
to review for an indefinite period every subsequent message posted anywhere on its entire
system and to block any of them that could possibly be similar to the original offending message.

The policy implications of Plaintiff's proposed rule that interactive service
providers must engage in screening once they know or have reason to know that "libelous,
defamatory or bogus material" has been posted on their systems are far-reaching and plainly
cor;ttrary to Congress's intent. Plaintiff's proposed rule would actually have the perverse effect
of discouraging the very sort of Good Samaritan actions that Congress intended to promote. 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). If a provider knew it would incur editorial duties and become subject to
potential liability once it might have reason to know that a particular posting might be offensive,
the provider would have a strong incentive to keep itself ignorant of what is on its system. Thus,
a provider that knew it would not be liable for a third party's content might monitor its bulletin
boards and eliminate content that it perceived to be harmful as a Good Samaritan action. But

Plaintiff's suggestion that the government regulation with which Congress was
concerned did not include state tort law (PI. Opp. at 13) is demonstrably false. Even he concedes
that one of the purposes of Section 230 was to overrule Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy
Service Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (PI. Opp. at 10), a case that was
decided on the basis of New York common law. In any event, Section 230(d)(3) prohibits any
action brought under "any [inconsistent] State or local law," which clearly includes state
common law.
.
21
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that provider would be significantly less likely to engage in such monitoring under Plaintiff's
proposed rule: by monitoring its boards, the provider would have reason to know about offensive
posts and therefore incur legal duties and potential liability it would undoubtedly rather avoid.
In proposing a rule that would discourage Good Samaritan actions, it is Plaintiff, not AOL, who
is attempting to "tum[] the CDA on its head." PI. Opp. at 2.

Plaintiff finally asserts that, under AOL's interpretation of Section 230, he would
have no remedy for his alleged damage. As he puts it, "Congress surely did not leave Zeran
alone to chase" the prankster who posted these messages. (PI. Opp. at 13.) As AOL pointed out
in its opening memorandum, however, Congress did not "leave Zeran alone." Rather, it
~xpressly

sought "to ensure vigorous enfor.cement of Federal crirninallaws to deter and punish"

the type of conduct engaged in by the person who posted the messages in this case. 47 U.S.C. §
230(b)(5). Indeed, Plaintiff's own Complaint demonstrates that he was far from "alone" in
chasing the prankster in this case -- the Secret Service, the FBI, and the local police were all
involved. (Complaint ~~ 16, 27,29-31, 34). No legal regime can ever guarantee that every
victim of wrongful conduct will be able to find the wrongdoer and recover his alleged damages.
But that fact cannot justify treating AOL as the publisher of third party content in direct
contravention of Section 230.

II.

SECTION 230 REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF TIDS CASE EVEN THOUGH THE
EVENTS AT ISSUE OCCURRED BEFORE IT WAS ENACTED.

As AOL established in its opening memorandum, although the CDA was enacted
after the events described in Plaintiff's complaint allegedly occurred, Section 230 controls this
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case. First, the text of Section 230 reveals that Congress expressly prescribed that the section
applies to suits involving antecedent events. (Def. Mem. at 18-19.) Second, even if Section 230
contained no such express prescription, application of the statute to antecedent events will not
have a "retroactive effect" under any of the three tests set out in Landgraf v. US! Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1505 (1994). (Def. Mem. at 19-21.) Accordingly, following
Landgraf, this Court must apply the law in effect at the time of its decision -- namely, Section
230 -- and dismiss Plaintiff's suit.

Zeran acknowledges that Landgraf provides the framework for analyzing whether
Section 230 controls this case. (PI. Opp. at 18 -19.) He further concedes that Congress may
expressly prescribe that a statute apply to antecedent events and that, even in the absence of such
a prescription, a statute will apply to a suit involving events pre-dating its enactment unless the
statute has a "retroactive effect" as defined in Landgraf. Qd. at 19, 21.) Zeran argues, however,
that Congress did not provide the requisite express prescription (ill. at 19-21) and that Section
230 does have a retroactive effect.

A.

ilih at 21-29.)

He is wrong on both counts.

Congress Expressly Prescribed that Section 230 Applies to Events Pre-Dating
Its Enactment.

The plain text of Section 230 discloses Congress's intent that the statute govern
any suit pending or filed after enactment of the statute. Section 230 prescribes that "[n]o cause
of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State of local law that is
inconsistent with this section." 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(3). This language could hardly be clearer:
from the date of the CDA's enactment (February 8, 1996), no action may be filed and no liability
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may be imposed under any state or local law inconsistent with Section 230.~1 Indeed, the plain
meaning of the phrase "no liability may be imposed" is that Congress barred liability from being
imposed even in suits that were pending when Section 230 was enacted. Therefore, f! fortiori,
Section 230 must also be read as controlling all new lawsuits filed after its enactment.

As AOL established in its opening brief, acceptance of Plaintiff's argument that
Section 230 forbids only suits involving post-enactment events would not only defy the plain
meaning of Section 230(d)(3), but would also violate the canon that a statute should not be
interpreted in a manner that renders part of its language superfluous. Specifically, AOL showed
that unless Section 230 is interpreted to apply to suits that were pending when the statute was
enacted (suits that necessarily would have involved pre-enactment events), the clause "no
liability may be imposed" would be superfluous. (See Def. Mem. at 18-19.)

Rather than attempting to confront this argument and offer an alternative
interpretation 'Of Section 230(d)(3), Zeran erroneously contends that Landgraf "rejected the
argument that retroactivity was required to avoid making some language in the [Civil Rights]
Act superfluous" and that AOL's argument is somehow "comparable." (PI. Opp. at 20.) This
simply begs the question. To be sure, Landgraf did reject an argument that failing to apply the
Civil Rights Act to antecedent events would render a portion of that Act superfluous, because it
found the language at issue would still have a purpose even if that Act was applied only

AOL does not, as Zeran erroneously suggests, argue that "by adopting an
effective date ... Congress intended that the CDA should be applied retroactively." (PI. Opp. at
20.) In fact, Section 230 does not even have an explicit effective date and therefore simply went
into effect on the date of its enactment. See Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 1997 WL
20401, No. 96-3489, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 1997).

§!
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prospectively. See Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1493. But the Landgraf Court did not reach this
conclusion by abandoning the canon that statutes should be read so as to give effect to all
provisions. Indeed, the very fact that the Court went through a lengthy analysis of the Civil
Rights Act to determine whether purely prospective application would render statutory language
superfluous demonstrates just the opposite -- the Court believed that an analysis of particular
statutory language in light of this canon can help determine if Congress has expressly prescribed
that a statute should apply to antecedent events.

B.

Section 230 Does Not Have "Retroactive Effect."

Even if this Court were to conclude (contrary to the foregoing analysis) that
Congress did not expressly provide that Section 230 applies to events pre-dating its enactment,
the statute would still control this case because it does not have a "retroactive effect.,,11 (See Def.
Mem. at 19-21.) Zeran disputes this conclusion on the ground that the law embodies a
"presumption against retroactive legislation" and that considerations of fairness preclude such
retroactive application in this case. (PI. Opp. at 21-29.) Zeran's analysis is incorrect.

Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion that "the Landgraf court start[ed] with the general
proposition that 'the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our

Under Landgraf, "'retroactive effect' is a term of legal art, which does not
describe all applications of a statute to preexisting causes of action or pending proceedings. The
definition of 'retroactive effect' in this context is more narrow than that. ... " Hunter v. United
States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1570 (11th Cir. 1996). Thus, the fact that a statute applies retrospectively
-- to events occurring before enactment of the statute -- does not necessarily mean it has a
"retroactive effect."

11
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jurisprudence'" (PI. Opp. at 21), the Court actually sought to reconcile two longstanding
principles that had appeared to be in some tension. As it explained, "[a]lthough we have long
embraced a presumption against statutory retroactivity, for just as long we have recognized that,
in many situations, a court should 'apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,'
even though that law was enacted after the events that gave rise to the suit."

Landgr~

114

S. Ct. at 1501 (citation omitted). The Court observed that the "familiar considerations affair
notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance" in attempting to
resolve any tension between these principles. Id. at 1499. After surveying how past cases had
applied these considerations when analyzing whether a statute should be applied to antecedent
events, the Supreme Court concluded that a court should apply the law in effect at the time of
decision -- even in cases involving events pre-dating the enactment of a statute -- if doing so .
does not have "retroactive effect." The Court further held that application of a statute to pre.,.
enactment events does not have "retroactive effect" unless it would "impair rights a party
possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with
respect to transactions already completed." Id. at 1505.

Rather than deal with this three-prong test, Zeran initially asserts that "[s]ince
Landgraf was decided, the courts have uniformly declined to give retroactive effect to federal
statutes." (PI. Opp. at 22.) This claim is patently untrue. In fact, in one of the cases Plaintiff
himself cites as an example of a court declining to apply a statute to antecedent events, the court
actually concluded that such application was appropriate under Landgraf. See Lindh v. Mw:phy,
96 F.3d 856, 863-67 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted in part, 117 S. Ct. 726 (1997). Moreover, this
Court itself relied on Landgraf to conclude that a statute concerning the revival of expired
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patents should apply in a case involving events pre-dating the enactment of the statute. See
Centigram Communications Com. v. Lehman, 862 F. Supp. 113 , 118-19 (E.D. Va. 1994) (Ellis,
J.), appeal di.smissedper agmt. of the parties, 47 F.3d 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Kolster v.
INS, 101 F.3d 785, 788-90 (lstCir. 1996)(statutorypreclusion of judicial review could b e
applied under Landgraf in ~ase involving pre-enactment events); Forest v. U.S. Postal Service,
97 F.3d 137, 140 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying statute of limitations to case involving conduct predating enactment of statute).

Plaintiff next cites a laundry list of cases discussing retroactivity in the' context of
statutes other than the CDA. (PI. Opp. at 22-25 .) Plaintiff merely summarizes the holdings of
the cases and generally fails to explain the relevance of any of them to the analysis of Section
230. An examination of these cases demonstrates that they offer Plaintiff no help. For example,
while the court in Preston v. Com. of Va. ex reI. New River Community College, 31 F.3d 203
(4th Cir. 1994), did decline to apply a particular section ofthe Civil Rights Act to antecedent
events, it did so on the ground that such application would unfairly increase the liability of the
defendant employer. See id. at 208. Clearly, Section 230 increases no party's liability.
Plaintiff's citation to United States v. Bacon, 82 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 1996), is similarly unhelpful.
Although the court in that case refused to apply a statute extinguishing fraudulent conveyance
claims based on antecedent events, the claims at issue were intended to protect ~ creditor's
vested contractual or property rights. See id. at 824. As discussed below, Section 230 does not
impair any comparable vested right. Plaintiff's other citations are similarly inapposite.Y

One case Plaintiff cites was reversed on the ground that the case did not even
(continued ...)
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Plaintiff next pays lip service to the three-prong test established in Landgraf. (See
PI. Opp. at 25-27). He fails, however, to show how application of Section 230 in a case
involving pre-enactment events would have a "retroactive effect" under any of those three
prongs. The first two prongs of this test clearly do not apply in this case -- Section 230 neither
"increase[s] a party's liability for past conduct" nor "imposes new duties" on anyone. Plaintiff
complains that these prongs of the test generally operate to favor defendants seeking to avoid
liability rather than plaintiffs seeking to impose liability. (See PI. Opp. at 27). Far from being
untoward or unfair, however, this differential impact follows inevitably from the very
considerations of fair notice and reasonable reliance that Zeran invokes. Retroactivity law has
l~ng

endorsed such differeJ1ti(i1 treatment:
The presumption against statutory retroactivity has consistently
been explained by reference to the unfairness of imposing new
burdens on persons after the fact. Indeed, at common law a
contrary rule applied to statutes that merely removed a burden on
private rights by repealing a penal provision (whether criminal or
civil); such repeals were understood to preclude punishment for
acts antedating the repeal.

'#

( ... continued)

raise a retroactivity issue. See Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission v.
O'Leary, 93 F.3d 103, 113 (3rd Cir. 1996). Another case involved a situation in which an
attorney had a vested right in fees for services already performed. See Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d
914, 921 (7th Cir. 1996). The remaining cases on which Plaintiff relies dealt with statutes that
increased a defendant's liability, a situation that clearly does not apply to this case. See Burris v.
Parke, 95 F.3d 465,468 (7th Cir. 1996); Boria v. Keane, 90 F.3d 36,37-38 (2nd Cir. 1996);
McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1240-41 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. $814.254.76. in
U.S. Currency, 51 F.3d 207,209-11 (9th Cir. 1995); Travenol Laboratories. Inc. v. United States,
936 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996); Bohrman v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co.,
926 F. Supp. 211 (D. Me. 1996).
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Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1500. The reason for this difference is clear -- unlike a defendant, a
prospective plaintiff generally does not reasonably rely on the absence or existence of a
particular cause of action except to the extent that the plaintiff plans and files a lawsuit. Indeed,
Zeran points primarily to just this type of conduct as evidence of his supposed "reliance." (PI.
Opp. at 28-29.) He does not allege (and cannot show) that any action he took other than
preparing to sue AOL was in any sense dependent on an expectation of a valid claim against
AOL. But as Zeran himself observes elsewhere in his opposition, new rules that affect only "the
plaintiff's conduct in filing the claim" do not have a retroactive effect. (PI. Opp. at 26.),1.1

When Zeran finally reaches the only prong of the Landgraf analysis that even
arguably might apply to Section 230 -- namely the test of whether application of a statute to preenactment events would "impair rights a party possessed when he acted" -- he completely misses
the mark. AOL demonstrated in its opening memorandum both (a) that this prong of the test for a
retroactive effect may be met only if the statute impairs a "vested right" (Def. Mem. at 19-20);
and (b) that the elimination of a potential or even pending tort claim does not impair a vested
right. ad. at 20.)

Zeran points to three cases in which courts declined to apply a statute to
antecedent events where such application would have eliminated a claim that otherwise could
have been brought. (PI. Opp. at 28 n. 16.) In one of these, United States v. Bacon, the statute
would have impaired the plaintiff's vested rights, a condition that is inapplicable here. See supra
at 15. In the other two, Maitland v. University of Minnesota, 43 F.3d 357,361-63 (8th Cir.
1994), and Rafferty v. City of Youngstown, 54 F.3d 278,281 n.l (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 338 (1995), the plaintiff had expressly relied on the pre-existing law by participating in
judicial proceedings under the assumption that such participation would not affect his right to
bring a subsequent suit. Zeran has not, and cannot, shown any similar reliance in this case.

2/
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Zeran's principal response is to suggest -- without citation to any authority -- that
even if a pending tort claim is not a vested right, "[i]t does not follow that a pending tort claim
has no status in the Landgraf analysis which focuses on the fundamental fairness of
retroactivity." (PI. Opp. at 26.) Even taken on its own terms, Zeran's argument fails. Zeran did
not even have a pending tort claim at the time Section 230 was enacted. Moreover, Zeran simply
could not reasonably rely on, or have settled expectations about, the existence of a common law
"rule" that he purports to draw from dicta in a single district court decision applying the law of a
jurisdiction that does not even govern this case. The absence of any unfairness to Zeran is
further underscored by his concession that this is a case of first impression in which a jury will
have to determine the appropriate standard of care for interactive service providers "for the first
time." (PI. Opp. at 15.)

In any event, as AOL established in its opening memorandum (Def. Mem. at 1920), the Landgraf Court concluded that under the third prong of its test, application of a statute to
pre-enactment events is fair, and does not have retroactive effect, so long as it does not impair a
vested right. Zeran cites no case holding that a pending tort claim (and the underlying common
law rule on which it is based) are vested rights. The law is plainly to the contrary: "cases have
clearly established that a person has ... no vested interest[] in any rule of common law." Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n. 32 (1978) (internal
quotations omitted); New York Central RR. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917) ("No
person has a vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him to insist that it shall remain
unchanged for his benefit."). "Because rights in tort do not vest until there is a final,
unreviewable judgment, Congress abridge [s] no vested rights of plaintiff by ... retroactively
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abolishing [plaintiff's] cause of action in tort." Hammond v. United States, 768 F.2d 8, 12 (1st
Cir. 1986); see also In re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-730, 1996
WL 665357 (Jan. 13, 1997) (statute that eliminates pending tort claim does not impair a vested

right); Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. v. United States, 888 F. Supp. 543, 551 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (statute that eliminated tort claim applied to pre-enactment events because such a claim is
not a vested right until reduced to final judgment), aff'd, 75 F.3d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 51 (1996).

In sum, applying Section 230 to this case would neither deprive Plaintiff of any
vested right nor treat him unfairly in any other respect, and it therefore does not have retroactive
effect. Accordingly, under the principles set out in Landgraf, Section 230 -- the law in effect at
the time of decision -- controls this case.!Q1

Plaintiff attaches an assortment of documents to his opposition and erroneously
asserts that they convert AOL's motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary
judgment. (PI. Opp. at 2.) Plaintiff's attachments do not alter the nature of AOL's motion
because they contain no facts outside of the pleadings that are at all germane to the issues raised
by AOL's motion. Moreover, Plaintiff has utterly failed to comply with Local Rule 10(F)(2),
under which a brief opposing a motion for summary judgment must include a "specifically
captioned section listing all material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine
issue necessary to be litigated." While AOL disputes the truth of many of the facts asserted by
Plaintiff (including many of those in the attachments to his opposition), for purposes of this
motion it treats all allegations in the Complaint as true.

lQI
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as for the reasons set out in AOL's opening
memorandum, AOL respectfully requests this Court to grant judgment on the pleadings in its
favor and to dismiss Plaintiff s suit with prejudice.
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